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DRAWING A LINE IN THE SHIFTING SAND OF
SOCIAL MEDIA: ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT
TEACHERS FROM "LIKING"' A STUDENT
OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM
I. INTRODUCTION

It is a main tenet of our modem American society that the innocent
youth must be protected from those who wish to do them harm.2
Nowhere is this more evident than in the context of the American
classroom. 3 Scandals in recent times constantly remind the population
that even in the facilities we entrust to educate and mold our children as
they mature towards adulthood, they are still threatened by those who
wish to satisfy their own needs by violating the separation between
student and teacher.4 It stands to reason that the institutions of learning
within our states would strike back, trying to keep the wall between
those who wish to harm, and those too young to protect themselves,
strong and impenetrable. However, how far is too far? When does the
desire to protect the youth of our generation become overzealous, so that
it infringes upon the rights state teachers are entitled to have? One state,
along with a multitude of school districts throughout the country, has
begun to grapple with this dilemma.5 The outcome will likely be a
delicate tightrope walk, which will rarely be feasible to perform.
The Amy Hestir Student Protection Act (Amy Hestir Act), passed
in Missouri on July 14, 2011 was designed to help the state school
system fight sexual abuse inflicted on students by their teachers.6 In

1. This term is common among the users of Facebook. It denotes an action that may be taken
by a user on this social media website. A user who intends to show approval of an item on another
user's webpage clicks an icon marked "Like," which appears next to photos, comments and other
features of the webpage. See generally What Does It Mean to "Like" Something?, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/help/l1 0920455663362 (last visited Oct. 19, 2012) (explaining the
"Like" function of Facebook).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.A-B.
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particular, section 162.069 of the law directed every school district to
develop a written policy concerning teacher-student communications,
while subsection 4 provided further that: "No teacher shall establish a
nonwork-related internet site which allows exclusive access with a
current or former student."' This type of prohibition is overly broad for
its intended purpose, overly vague in that it does not allow a teacher to
understand what conduct will violate the statute, and it tries to control
the activities of teachers outside the schoolhouse. Therefore, this type of
prohibition should be rewritten in order to prevent such restrictions on
the private lives of teachers, and any confusion over what a teacher can
and cannot do online with their students. In addition to looking at other
school districts' attempts to create similar regulations to stem the
possible tide of teachers harassing students via social media8 websites,
such as Facebook,9 Twitter, 0 MySpace," and other similar social
networking sites, this note will demonstrate how Missouri and other
states could write such a statute.
This note will propose a hypothetical regulation that states could
adopt in order to protect students from unwanted communication with
teachers, while simultaneously remaining narrow enough so that the
construction does not cause states to violate teachers' free association
rights under the First Amendment or public policy.
This note will first explore the history of the statute, including why
the statute was enacted and what the repercussions have been since its
adoption in Missouri. Part II will give glimpses of other similar
provisions that other state school districts have implemented in response
to the growing concern about the Internet as a portal for teachers to
abuse students. The focus will then shift in Part III to the concept of an

7. S. 54, 96h Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).
8. Social media are "forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking
and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas,
personal messages, and other content (as videos)[.]" Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
9. "Millions of people use Facebook everyday to keep up with friends, upload an unlimited
number of photos, share links and videos, and learn more about the people they meet." About,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk-info (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
10. "Twitter is a real-time information network that connects you to the latest stories, ideas,
opinions and news about what you find interesting." About, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last
visited Oct. 19, 2012).
11. "Myspace drives social interaction by providing a highly personalized experience around
entertainment and connecting people to the music, celebrities, TV, movies, and games that they
love. These entertainment experiences are available through multiple platforms, including online,
[and] mobile devices...." About Us, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/AboutUs (last
visited Oct. 19, 2012).
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employer controlling the outside activities of its employees in order to
satisfy an intended purpose of the employer. Part IV will confront the
limitations the courts have placed on overbroad laws which seek to
control the right to freedom of association of teachers. Through Part V,
the Amy Hestir Act will be applied to current cases to show the possible
applications of this new law. The final section of this note will propose
suggestions as to how the Amy Hestir Act can be improved in order to
serve the important goals of the state, while simultaneously protecting
the rights of the teachers.
II. HISTORY OF THE MISSOURI LAW AND OTHER SIMILAR REGULATIONS

Similar to many other statutes, the Amy Hestir Student Protection
Act was not simply created on a whim; it has a clearly articulated
purpose. The story of an abused student, and a concern for other
children, proved to be enough of a driving force to convince the state of
Missouri to pass a law unseen in any other state.12 However, real-world
ramifications that stemmed from this novel action would distort its
purpose, and require changes in the law before it could even achieve any
of the legislature's goals.
A. The Amy Hestir Case andthe Statute It Spawned
On May 12, 2011, a press release was issued by Missouri Senator
Jane Cunningham's office.' 3 The statement calls the Amy Hestir
Student Protection Act Senator Cunningham's work and indicates that it
was legislation aimed at protecting children from sexual abuse.' 4 While
the bill received a vast amount of support in the Missouri House of
Representatives, Senator Cunningham was the actual sponsor behind it.15
"'After five years of fighting, I'm proud to see this legislation finally
sent to the governor's desk - children in our state are now one big step
closer to having solid protection from sexual predators in their schools,"'

12.
SILHA

Mikel J. Sporer, Social Media Laws Aim to Curb Bullying and Abuse of Children Online,
CTR.

FOR

THE

STUDY

OF

MEDIA

ETHICS

&

LAW

BULLETIN,

http://www.silha.umn.edu/news/Fall201 1/socialmediabullying.html.
13. Press Release, Sen. Jane Cunningham, Senator Cunningham's "Arnir Hestir Student
Protection
Act"
Sent
to
the
Governor
(May
12,
2011),
available at
http://www.senate.mo.gov/mediaIl 1info/Cunningham/releases/CunninghamAmyHestirPassed05121 1.htm [hereinafter Cunningham Press Release].
14. Id.
15. Id
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said Senator Cunningham.16 She stated further that the legislation was
"vital" for protecting students from acts of sexual misconduct by school
employees.17 She maintained that "'[her] bill" would make extensive
background checks mandatory and make it possible for school officials
to use knowledge of sexual misconduct to make staffing and potential
hiring decisions.' 8
Missouri school districts have been plagued by an unsafe practice
that has become known as "passing the trash." 19 This phrase refers to a
common Missouri practice whereby teachers and employees with
records of sexual misconduct are able to move from one school district
to another. 20 They were enabled to do so by Missouri's prior
employment laws and a belief that sharing information about past
employees would lead to lawsuits. 2 1 According to her press release,
Cunningham's bill would put an end to "passing the trash," and create
safer hiring practices that would protect school children. 22 The new law
would allow school districts in Missouri to discuss information about
their employees with other school districts.23 Perhaps more importantly,
it would hold school districts liable for damages if they failed to disclose
any actions of sexual misconduct in a reference request from another
school district.24
On February 6, 2008 Amy Hestir Davis appeared in front of the
Missouri legislature to speak in support of the bill titled "The Amy
Hestir Davis Student Protection Act." 25 She recounted her tragic
childhood tale of abuse before the Missouri House Education
Committee, in order to provide some context for the reasoning behind
the writing of the bill. 6 Although this was only the second time she
discussed her haunted past, Amy was willing and eager to explain her
story and answer any questions posed by her audience.27
Amy was abused beginning when she was twelve-years-old and
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Missouri: Amy Hestir Davis Student Protection Act - Student Abused by a Jr. High
School Teacher, SEXLAWS.ORG, http://www.sexlaws.org/amyhestir-davis student_protection-act
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Student AbusedBy Jr. High School Teacher].
26. Id.
27. Id.
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entering the seventh grade.28 The mistreatment continued for nearly two
years, until she left her junior high school upon graduating from eighth
grade. 29 Amy recounted: "I was a shy kid. I came from kind of a
troubled home and I appreciate[d] the extra attention that I got from a
teacher at my Jr. High School that was nicknamed the 'Art Coach'., 3 0
Amy would meet the teacher during free periods and was also a
babysitter for his young daughter.31 The teacher would drive her home
from babysitting, but take elongated routes to create opportunities for
abuse.32 Amy would also ride her bike to the teacher's house after the
school day was over, and remain there until just before the teacher's
wife would return home around five o'clock.33 Amy classified that time
in her life as "the darkest period of my life growing up and the wors[t]
thing that has ever happened to me." 34 She admitted that she consented
to an ongoing sexual relationship with her teacher out of fear, and that
the relationship lasted for more than a year.35 However, she was
adamant about taking that horrible experience and using it to do
something positive, not just to benefit the children of Missouri, but
children throughout the nation.36
By the time Amy gained the courage to discuss her abuse with an
adult, it was nearly ten years after the events.37 At that point, the statute
of limitations had nearly expired and the prosecuting attorney chose not
to file the complaint.38 Amy had not told her story earlier because of her
feelings of guilt and shame, and the teacher's statements that if others
knew what she had been a part of, it would ruin her life and the lives of
her family members. 9 She decided to speak to the Missouri legislature
because she realized that sharing her experience is one way to prevent
future incidents such as hers from happening to other innocent
children.4 0
With Amy Hestir Davis's testimony echoing in their ears, the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
See id
Id.
Id.
See id
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
See id
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Missouri legislature turned Senate Bill 54 into law in 201 1.41 In section
162.069, the statute required that each school district formulate a written
policy by January 1, 2012, laying out the ground rules for
communications between students and teachers and students and
employees.42 While the statute did not specifically dictate what these
new policies were required to say, it did provide some necessary
elements. The first necessary element was a description of appropriate
oral and nonverbal personal communication, which could be combined
with the school's policies on sexual harassment. 43 That requirement was
to be accompanied by a section addressing the appropriate use of
electronic media for both instructional and educational purposes."
Examples of electronic media that were addressed include text
messaging, websites, and social media sites.45 Ironically, in Amy's story
of abuse, the teacher did not create his opportunities for molestation
through any type of electronic media.
While those beginning requirements were broad and left the
language of the restrictions mostly in the hands of the individual school
districts, the remaining subsections of the statute impose highly stringent
controls on the school districts, specifically in regard to the use of
electronic communication. No teacher is allowed to "establish, maintain
or use a work-related [I]nternet site unless such site is available to school
administrators and the child's legal custodian, physical custodian, or
legal guardian."4 In the same sense, no teacher is allowed to establish,
maintain, or use a non-work-related Internet site that allows for
exclusive access with a current or former student.4 7 Furthermore, the
Act provided that, by July 1, 2012, every school district must "include in
its teacher and employee training a component that provides up-to-date
and reliable information on identifying signs of sexual abuse in children
and danger signals of potentially abusive relationships between children
and adults."4
This training must "emphasize the importance of
mandatory reporting of abuse . . . and how to establish an atmosphere of

trust so that students feel their school has concerned adults with whom
they feel comfortable discussing matters related to abuse.49
41.
42.
43.

S. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).
Id.
Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48.

49.
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It is clear from the language of the statute and the use of Amy
Hestir Davis's testimony that this law was aimed at preventing the
sexual abuse of children. More specifically, the law aims to stop
incidences of sexual abuse that occur through electronic portals by
limiting the interactions teachers and school employees have with the
children.so It discourages any communication outside of the classroom,
especially communication through technological mediums, such as cell
phones and the Internet.5' In an attempt to cover all of their bases, the
Missouri legislature unintentionally. enacted a broad statute that would
soon be attacked as overstepping the boundaries of its admirable
purpose.
B. PostAmy Hestir: The Backlash, the Lawsuit, and the Amendment
Missouri Governor Jay Nixon signed the bill on July 14, 2011,52
and the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act was slated to take effect on
August 28, 2011.53 However, litigation quickly began, arising from the
concerns of the Missouri State Teachers Association (MSTA or "the
association").54 The MSTA brought suit against the state, requesting
that the court grant injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment.ss The
MSTA first contended that section 162.069 of the Amy Hestir Student
Protection Act infringed upon state teachers' First Amendment right to
freedom of speech in denying them the use of social media sites.5 6
Further, the association argued that the Act was unconstitutionally
overbroad, because prohibiting teachers from using social networking
sites to communicate with students would "deter legitimate exercise of
first amendment rights."57 The MSTA also put forth the argument that

50.
51.
52.
THE

See id.
See id.
Jackson Buckley, Missouri FacebookLaw: Why Can't Teachers and Students be Friends,
CHRISTIAN

SCIENCE

MONITOR

(Aug.

23,

2011),

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2011/0823/Missouri-Facebook-Law-why-can-tteachers-and-students-be-friends.
53. Id.
54. See Stephanie Backus, Teachers' Association FilesLawsuit Over Social Networking Law,
CONNECTMIDMISSOURI.COM
(Aug.
19,
2011,
4:55
PM),
http://www.connectmidmissouri.com/news/story.aspx?id=65372 1#.TpM9pbKtluE.
55. Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, Missouri State Teachers Ass'n
v. State of Missouri, No. 11AC-CC00553 (19th Jud. Cir. Mo. Aug. 26 2011), available at
http://www.msta.org/news/Petition_fihal.pdf [hereinafter Petition for Injunctive Relief and
Declaratory Judgment].
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
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the act was unconstitutionally vague, lacking sufficient standards to
control school districts' discretion under the law.ss
The MSTA also argued that the law violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It claimed that the law
prevented parents who are also teachers from communicating with their
own children who are students. 6 0 The law also infringed upon the
parents' right to educate and raise their children, and limited the ways in
which parents could communicate with their children without a
compelling governmental interest to do so. 6 1
Seven days after the submission of their motion, on August 24,
2011, Judge Jon. E. Beetem granted the MSTA's motion for a
preliminary injunction.62 Judge Beetem agreed with the MSTA stating
that, "the breadth of the prohibition is staggering." 63 He further found
that section 162.069 would have a chilling effect on teacher speech,
constituted immediate and irreparable harm, and therefore, should be
prevented with a preliminary injunction.64 This injunction stopped the
implementation of section 162.069, and was to last until February 20,
2012, or until the case was decided on the merits.65
On the same day that the decision of the Missouri court was handed
down, Governor Jay Nixon called for the legislature to repeal the parts
of the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act that involved communication
between students and teachers." While stating that other parts of the bill
could be saved, the Governor called for teachers, parents and others that
would be affected by the bill to give their input on the subject. 67 Gail
McCray, counsel for the MSTA supported the idea of using the extra
time to "come to a proper resolution rather than rushing to piece together
language that doesn't resolve the concerns of educators or allow time for

58. Id.at 5.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id
62. Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, Missouri State Teachers Ass'n v. State of
Missouri, No. 1IAC-CC00553 (19th Jud. Cir. Mo. Aug. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.msta.org/files/resources/publications/injunction.pdf
[hereinafter
Order
Entering
Preliminary Injunction].
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Ned Potter, Missouri 'Facebook' Law: Judge Grants Injunction Against Limits on Online
Contact Between
Teachers and Students,
ABC
NEWS
(Aug.
26,
2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/missouri-facebook-law-injunction-granted-law-banteachers/story?id=14388569.
67. Id.
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teacher input."68
The Missouri Senate responded quickly to the court's decision by
revising the bill and sending it to the Missouri House of Representatives
for a floor debate on September 22, 201 1.69 This debate in the House
culminated in the adoption of amendments to the bill on September 23,
2011.70 The amendments discarded the definitions describing former
student, exclusive access and work-related and non-work-related Internet
sites. 7 1 Teachers were also no longer prohibited from having and using
Internet sites that allowed them to communicate with students.7 2 With
his signature, Governor Nixon effectively repealed section 162.069 of
the Amy Hestir Act on October 21, 2011,73 seemingly ending the debate
over the statute. However, a portion of the bill still requires school
districts to create their own social media polices to control studentteacher interactions.74 Groups such as the American Civil Liberties
Union have encouraged Governor Nixon to veto the repeal based upon
this requirement, fearing that instead of actually solving the problem
with the original law, Missouri has now left local school districts to
create policies that may not address any of the issues raised.75
Even after the repeal of section 162.069, there are still new
concerns being raised over the wording of the act and the implications of
its far reach into the way teachers and students use websites for
educational purposes inside the classroom.76 Additionally, while they
were successful in getting section 162.069 repealed in Missouri through
a lawsuit, the MSTA had to decide whether they would drop the lawsuit
that had won them a preliminary injunction until February 20, 2012.
68. Id.
69. 'Facebook Law' Revised in Senate, on to the House, JOPLIN GLOBE (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://www.joplinglobe.com/local/x2l27773043/Facebook-Law-revised-in-Senate-on-to-the-House.
70. See Tim Sampson, Missouri House Sends Facebook Fix to the Governor, Mo. NEWS
HORIZON (Sept. 24, 2011), http://missouri-news.org/news/education/missouri-house-sendsfacebook-fix-to-the-govemor/9294 (noting that the amendments changed the controversial social
media provision of the bill).
71. S. 1, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Mo. 2011).
72. Id.
73. See David A. Lieb, Mo. Repeals Teacher-Student 'Facebook'Ban, NBC NEWS (Oct. 21,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44994464/ns/technologyandsciencePM),
2011,
5:54
tech and gadgets/t/mo-repeals-teacher-student-facebook-ban/#.Tsr55fll SSo.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. ("[O]ne teacher feared the law could have prevented her class from
communicating with students in Australia through a closed website. Others raised concerns about
the law's effect on editing software for school yearbooks or on virtual classrooms, in which students
communicate with direct messages[.]").
77. Id.
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The MSTA also had to determine what other protective measures to take
in regards to the March 1, 2012 deadline set by the Missouri Senate for
school districts to create their own social media policies. In response
to the need for a model social media policy, the MSTA released their
own social media policy to guide the Missouri school districts. In this
model policy, the association stresses the importance of maintaining a
proper boundary between students and teachers.80 The model policy also
stresses the growing importance of electronic resources in the modem
world, emphasizing that skill in utilizing such technologies is critical in
preparing students to become citizens of the workforce.si While
indicating that the restriction of work related electronic activities might
be monitored and controlled by the school districts, the MSTA's policy
uses a stern tone in indicating that the same will not be true of non-work
related activities.82 In the final part of its model policy, the MSTA
firmly states:
The [School District] shall not implement any policies regarding nonwork-related employee communications conducted by its employees in
general, or which allow exclusive access with current and former
students. It shall not prohibit employees of the district from engaging
in any non-work-related activities or using non-work-related electronic
communications or new technology platforms. The balancing of the
individual employee's Constitutional rights to freedom of speech,
association, and religion outweigh the interests of the school district in
the non-work-related activities of its employees, subject to conduct and
communications already regulated by local, state and federal law. 83
The release of the MSTA's proposal was timely. Only a short time
after the model policy was released a Missouri school district began
contemplating the implementation of a social media policy.8 4 Aside
from the multitude of Missouri school districts that will soon have to
78. See JoLynne Martinez, Missouri State Teachers Association Offers Model
Communications Policy to Districts, KC EDUC. ENTERPRISE (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://kceducationenterprise.org/2011/12/20/missouri-state-teachers-association-offers-modelcommunications-policy-to-districts/.
79. See id.
80. See Mo. State Teachers Ass'n, Employee-Student Relations and Communications Policy,
Mo. STATE TEACHERS AsS'N, http://www.msta.org/files/comm_policy.pdf (2011).
8 1. See id
82. See id
83. Id.
84. See JoLynne Martinez, Liberty Board ofEducation to Meet Monday Evening, KC EDUC.
ENTERPRISE (Dec. 19, 2011), http://kceducationenterprise.org/2011/12/19/liberty-board-ofeducation-to-meet-monday-evening/.
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implement their own social media policies, other school districts around
the country have launched their own assault against the social media
terror they now find themselves grappling with.
C. A Multistate Front:Other School Districts That Have Confronted the
Facebook Conundrum

While Missouri stands alone when it comes to action taken by a
state legislature, other states' school districts were attempting to tackle
the problem of electronic communications between students and teachers
before the passage of the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act. One such
effort, which has been suggested for use throughout the Massachusetts
school system, is the social media policy created by the Massachusetts
Association of School Committees. This proposed statewide policy is
aimed at stopping "improper fraternization" between students and
teachers through social media.8 7 It requires superintendents to remind
teachers not to have inappropriate communications with students.
Particular emphasis is placed on actions such as "friending" 89 a student
on a social media site and giving a student your personal phone
number. 90 Such actions, if discovered by the superintendent, may lead to
disciplinary action or even termination.9t
Another attempt to curb student and teacher communication was
implemented in Pennsylvania. 9 2 After a scandal erupted over comments
a teacher made regarding her students on a blog, a local school board
proposed a policy to deal with social media. The policy banned online
activities by teachers that would "jeopardize the professional nature of

85. See infra Part II.C.
86. See Peter Schworm, Norton Warns Teachers Not to 'Friend'Students, BOSTON GLOBE
(Oct.
25,
2010),
http://www.boston.com/news/education/k12/articles/2010/10/25/nortonwarns_teachersnot-to_fr
iend-students/?page=1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. This term refers to the action of one person on a social media site, such as Facebook,
toward another user on the site. Upon accepting another users request to "friend" them, the two
users are given access to view each other's webpage, interact on the webpage itself and
communicate through the website.
90. Schworm, supra note 86.
91. Id.
92. See Julie Bonner, School District Proposes Social Media Policy for Teachers, BLOG
WORLD (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.blogworld.com/2011/09/14/school-district-proposes-socialmedia-policy-for-teachers/.
93. Id.
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the staff-student relationship." 94
Shortly after section 162.069 was passed and repealed in Missouri,
a school district in Dayton, Ohio passed its own similar social media
policy.95 The policy bans teachers from communicating with students
using text or instant messaging, or even responding to a student if it
would mean communication on a private account not approved by the
school district.9 6 Unlike the adverse reaction shown by the teachers
union in Missouri, the Ohio teachers union supported the measure,
indicating that it could be beneficial to the safety of schoolteachers,9 7
directing them away from any actions that could be interpreted as being
improper.
After two teachers had criminal charges brought against them based
on communications with students, an Idaho school district passed its
own social media policy.98 It bans teachers from talking to students on
social media websites about anything other than the student's education
or on a subject for which the teacher has been made responsible.99
Western states are also no stranger to this controversy. In Arizona,
some school districts have implemented polices that control whether
teachers may communicate with students on social media sites.1 00 In
Mesa public schools, teachers are not allowed to talk to students over
social media sites about subjects not related to school.' 0 1 Dysart schools
instead tell their teachers to keep their social media pages viewable only
to their friends, and teachers may not friend students. 10 2 This aims to
prevent students and teachers from having one-on-one interactions,
which would include interaction on these sites. 10 3
Along with the multiple examples of various school district policies
discussed above, in the wake of the Amy Hestir Act, a multitude of state

94. Id
95. Elizabeth Reed, Dayton Teachers Banned from Facebook, Texting Students,
AM),
31,
2011,
8:16
(Aug.
NORTHWESTOHIO.COM
http://www.northwestohio.com/news/story.aspx?id=657945.
96. Id
97. See id.
98. Laurie Welch, Minidoka County OKs its Own Version of Social-Media Policy, TIMESNEWS (Twin Falls, Idaho), (Dec. 24, 2010, 1:15 AM), http://magicvalley.com/news/local/minicassia/article c780982a-8ce6-59c5-b627-b94ece72bd82.html.
99. Id
100. See Jazmine Woodberry, Facebook FriendshipsBetween Teachers, Students a Concern,
ARIZONA
REPUBLIC
(Aug.
14,
2011,
12:00
AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/08/14/20110814facebook-teachers students.htmi.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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school districts were set to reevaluate their online policies for the fall
semester. 1 4 While not an exhaustive listing, the local provisions, along
with the Missouri statute, paint a comprehensive picture of a nationwide
attempt to combat the feared threat of inappropriate student-teacher
interaction through electronic mediums. However, thus far the focus has
been placed upon the reasoning and language behind these measures.
The Amy Hestir Act has already stirred up possible challenges to the
enforcement of such policies,os which require deeper exploration and
discussion.
III.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRIVATE LIVES OF EMPLOYEES

State employers have long-possessed the abilities to control how
their employees act within the workplace. However, in some instances,
employer control can extend beyond the jobsite, by attempting to control
For example, if an
the personal associations of its employees.
employee's relationship or association with a particular person can have
some impact on their job performance, or the effectiveness of the
employer's competitors, the employer may have the right to regulate
those activities, despite their occurrence outside of the workplace. This
same principle can be used to attempt to control the actions of
schoolteachers outside of the classroom, by dictating with whom they
can communicate, and in what ways.
A. Court Limitations on Employer Controlover the PrivateLives of
Employees
Multiple cases from varying jurisdictions address this issue. While
they do not all specifically refer to school district controls over teachers,
the same rules clearly apply. The case with the most relevant fact
scenario is Shelton v. Tucker. 06 In this case, a group of schoolteachers
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute that
required teachers in public schools to file affidavits stating the names
104.

See John H. Tucker, National Ink for Missouri's Teacher-Student Facebook Law,

RIVERFRONT

TIMES

(St.

Louis,

Mo.),

(Dec.

19,

2011,

1:15

PM),

http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/2011/12/newyorktimes missouri teachers.php (stating
that school boards in California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas
and Virginia will or have updated their online media policies).
105. See, e.g., Kevin Murphy, Missouri Teachers Sue to Block Social Media Law, REUTERS
(Aug. 20 2011, 1:48 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/20/us-schoolsmissouri-suit-idUSTRE77Jl QW20110820.
106. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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and addresses of all the organizations to which they belonged or
contributed within the previous five years as a prerequisite to their
employment.10 7
The court held that this requirement was
unconstitutional.108 Teachers were hired on a year-to-year basis, they
were not covered by a civil service system, and they had minimal job
security past the end of the school year.' 09 They were already in a
position with minimal leverage to create job security and the school
districts could not be entitled to this extra information." 0
In American Federation of Government Employees, Local 421 v.
Schlesinger,"' the court arrived at a comparable conclusion. The court
excused employees of the Department of Energy from having to answer
portions of a detailed questionnaire.1 2 Certain questions were deemed
overbroad and unreasonable, because they required employees to list the
names of all corporations, other business enterprises, partnerships,
nonprofit organizations, and educational or other institutions in which
they, their spouses, their minor children or dependents were connected
as an employee, officer, owner, director, trustee, advisor, partner or
consultant. 1
The schoolteachers in Missouri are in a similar situation. "Without
exception, the state controls virtually every aspect of the teaching
profession, particularly licensing and tenure,"ll 4 but also the curriculum
they are required to teach and the educational background they need.
With so many restrictions already in place, it would be unreasonable to
allow school districts to control how, when, and with whom teachers
communicate while not on the job. However, that is precisely what the
Amy Hestir Student Protection Act presumes to do. The courts have
proven, through these past decisions, that they prefer to respect the
privacy of employees rather than the curiosity of employers." 5
Activities that employees partake in on their own time, which threaten
neither their ability as an employee nor the success of the employer,
should remain privileged and private."16

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id at 480.
See id. at 490.
Id. at 482.
See id at490.
443 F.Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1978).
See id.at 433, 435.
See id.

114.

Kate Walsh, Introduction to NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, MO. STATE

TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK (2008), available at www.nctq.org/stypO8/reports/stpy missouri.pdf.
115. See, e.g., Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; American Federation,443 F.Supp. 431.
116. See Ken LaMance, Employee Privacy During Off-Work Hours, LEGALMATCH,
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There are other cases whose logic can be equated to the situation
In Rulon-Miller v.
the Missouri schoolteachers currently face.
International Business Machines Corp.,l 17 an employee of 3M was
successful in her claims of wrongful discharge and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.' 18 The employee was accused of having a
romantic relationship with the manager of a rival product's firm." 9 As a
result of those accusations, made by the employee's supervisor, the
employee was terminated.120 At trial, the employee presented facts
demonstrating that her relationship with the manager did not have a
negative impact on her job performance, and as a result, she received
awards of both compensatory and punitive damages.121 There was no
conflict of interest created by her relationship, therefore the jury's
finding that her termination was wrongful was upheld.122
This case demonstrated several important rules that govern
employer-employee relationships. Specifically, this case includes a
discussion of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which amounts
to a requirement that parties in at-will relationships must deal openly and
fairly with one another. 123 In order to be fair, employers must treat like
cases in the same manner by following the same evaluative procedures,
and ensure that all employees are afforded the protections of the rules
and regulations set out by the company.124 The Missouri-schoolteachers
are entitled to this same standard of fair dealing, and protection under
the regulations of the school districts. Therefore, they should not be
susceptible to termination based on interactions outside of school that do
not have a negative impact on their job performance, especially if other
school employees are not held to that same standard.
B. The Role ofPublic Policy in BalancingEmployer Control Over
Employee Freedom
There is also a public policy angle to the wrongful termination of an
employee. The courts in many states utilize a two-part test when
www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/employee-privacy-during-off-work-hours.html
Sept. 24, 2012).
117. 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
118. See id. at 530, 535.
119. See id at527.

120.

See id at 528.

121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 527, 531.
See id.at533.
See id at 529.
Id.
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attempting to determine if an action to deprive someone of their privacy
is constitutional or not.125 First, the person must have an actual or
subjective expectation of privacy. 12 6 Second, society must be willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable. 127 In Klein Independent School
Districtv. Mattox,128 the court further expanded on the autonomy portion
of the right to privacy. 12 9 The court's discussion explained that
constitutional rights were afforded to protect "intimate personal
relationships or activities, and freedoms to make fundamental choices3 0
involving oneself, one's family, and one's relationship with others."'1
A personal privacy interest has to fit into that categorization in order to
succeed in the personal versus public balancing test. Teachers do not
automatically "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse
gate." 31 However, only very specific rights are protected. For example,
the protection of personnel records is not recognized as a normally
protected federal privacy right. 13 2
Communication is essential to a teacher's success. 13 3 Unless the
lines of communication between the teacher and the students are open
and easily accessible, a teacher will have difficulty fostering a close
bond with the students. 134 This can hamper an effective learning
environment.13' Education is a highly valued asset in modern society,

125. See, e.g., Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 967 (Mont. 1984).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 830 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1987).
129. See id at 580.
130. Id. In Klein, a teacher sought to protect her college transcript from becoming public
knowledge, but the court held that the public's interest in evaluating the competency of teachers
significantly outweighed the teacher's privacy interest. Id. at 577-78, 581.
131. Hovet v. Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. 419 N.W.2d 189, 192 (N.D. 1988) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
132. See, e.g., id Hovet contended that opening the personnel file to the public would not only
violate the teacher's privacy interest, but also the privacy entitlements of students mentioned within
the file. See id at 190-93. The court rejected the latter notion based on the rules of standing,
claiming that "[a] litigant may assert only his own constitutional rights, unless he can present
'weighty countervailing policies."' Id. at 193 (citing State v. Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d 243, 249
(N.D. 1975); State v. Benjamin, 417 N.W.2d 838 (N.D. 1988); City of Bismark v. Mater, 177
N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970)).
133. See Teacher Student Communication: Some Strategies to Make It Successful,
CLASSROOM MGMT. SUCCESS, http://www.classroom-management-success.org/teacher-studentrelationship.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
134. The Teacher Student Relationship: 10 Things Teachers Can Do to Make It Successful,
CLASSROOM MGMT. SUCCESS, http://www.classroom-management-success.org/teacher-studentrelationship.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
135. See id
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with its furtherance at the forefront of many political platforms.1 6 It
seems apparent that the value of effective education, coupled with the
Constitutional right to protections of personal privacy, would outweigh
nearly any public interest that did not amount to something as serious as
criminal activity. The teacher's side of the scale is weighted with
concerns that are twofold. First, there is the priority that education be
promoted and delivered effectively. Second, there is the policy that a
person's intimate relationships should be protected from the public eye.
The Missouri legislature also had serious concerns adding weight to their
end of the balancing test.'3 7 Protecting vulnerable young students from
being taken advantage of and sexually abused is, indisputably, a strong
policy goal.13 8 However, teachers who use social networking and the
Internet, either to enhance their effectiveness as an educator or to
develop their own personal relationships, should not be forced to submit
to public scrutiny as a result of employer disciplinary actions for that one
reason alone.
In the case of Salazar v. Furr's Inc.,139 an employee claimed she
was terminated because of her marriage to an employee of a
competitor.140 The court did not find in favor of her wrongful
termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but
public policy issues were raised.141 The employee argued that allowing
employers to terminate their employees based on what relationships they
form would discourage family unity,14 2 which is an important public
policy consideration.
A similar argument can be applied to the
schoolteachers of Missouri. Firing schoolteachers based on appropriate
communications and personal relationships goes against the public
policy of protecting an expected right to personal privacy.
The most successful and effective teachers are the ones that are able
to communicate openly and honestly with their students. 143 "The
136.

See, e.g., Barack Obama, Introduction to U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR

REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 1

(2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint.pdf.
137. See generally Tanya Roscorla, The Reason Why Missouri Passedthe Amy Hestir Student
Protection
Act,
CTR.
FOR
DIGITAL
EDUC.
(Oct.
31,
2011),
http://www.centerdigitaled.com/policy/Missouri-Electronic-Communications-Part-One.html
(outlining the background and history of the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act).
138. See id
139. 629 F.Supp. 1403 (D.N.M. 1986).
140. Id at 1406.
141. See id at 1409, 1411-12.
142. Id. at 1409.
143. See The Positive Teacher-Student Relationship, CAL. ST. U. NORTHRIDGE,
http://www.csun.edu/-acc50786/Education.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
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communication between the student and the teacher ... provides a better
atmosphere for a classroom environment .... The more the teacher
connects or communicates with his or her students, the more likely they
will be able to help students learn at a high level and accomplish
quickly."'" Just as allowing employers to fire their employees would
discourage family unity in the Salazar case, intruding on teachers'
private lives would discourage open, honest and enthusiastic
communications with students. Teachers will be encouraged to hide
their relationships and actions outside of the workplace, in an attempt to
protect their jobs, instead of acting honestly and candidly. Many
teachers were outraged when they learned about the additional
restrictions the Amy Hestir Act would impose on their personal lives,145
while others were confused by what the vague language actually
prevented them from doing.146 Aspiring teachers who learn about the
personal intrusions and confusion that will accompany the job may be
scared away from that career, or unwilling to sacrifice their social
networking freedoms. For example, Kimberly Hester, a teacher's aide at
an elementary school, was fired for refusing to provide her Facebook
username and password to her employers.147 She chose to maintain her
personal privacy and usage of Facebook rather than continuing with her
employment as a teacher's aide.14 8 This demonstrates how the overly
restrictive policies within the Amy Hestir Act could limit the number of
willing teachers available for schools to hire, thereby lowering the
quality of teachers from which potential employers can make their
selections.
While the invocation of a public policy defense can be difficult,
especially when it competes with another strong policy like preventing
sexual abuse, there are situations where it has proven to be effective for
teachers attempting to protect their privacy rights. In Armada
Broadcasting,Inc. v. Stirn,149 a schoolteacher was the subject of a school
144. Id
145. Bob Buckley, Buckley: Law to Protect Students Will Have Unintended Consequences,
EXAMINER
(Independence,
Mo.)
(Aug.
16,
2011,
11:10
PM),
http://www.examiner.net/news/law/x27453375/Buckley-Law-to-protect-students-will-haveunintended-consequences?zc_p-0.
146. See Gabrielle Biondo, Teachers Suing Over Missouri Social Network Law, TowN AND
COUNTRY-MANCHESTER
PATCH
(Aug.
19,
2011),
http://townandcountrymanchester.patch.com/articles/teachers-suing-over-missouri-social-network-law.
147. Matt Rego, Teacher's Aid Axed for Not Giving School Her Facebook Password, VALUE
WALK (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/04/teachers-aid-axed-for-not-giving-schoolher-facebook-password/.
148. See id
149. 516 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. 1994).
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district investigation of employees who had allegedly engaged in sexual
harassment.' 50 The court held that the teacher had a general right to
privacy, because of the public policy right of protecting the reputation of
citizens.15 The report that the school district created was based on
speculation and uncorroborated information;s 2 therefore, the risk of
damage to the teacher's reputation was serious and unwarranted.s 3
This reasoning can be transferred to scenarios in which teachers are
using social networking for personal reasons or to communicate with
their students.
An assumption that the communications are
inappropriate, or invasive of the private interactions in a teacher's life,
could be extremely damaging to that teacher's reputation. A recent trend
in court decisions suggests that a teacher's interest in protecting her
privacy for the sake of her reputation could outweigh the public's right
to information.' 54 Teachers are dependent on their reputations for their
careers and livelihoods.'5 ' The public's curiosity concerning how a
teacher socializes outside of the school environment pales in comparison
to protecting that teacher's ability to earn a living. Furthermore, a false
assumption that a teacher's communications with a student via social
networking or e-mail are inappropriate could be extremely harmful to
the reputations of both the teacher and the student.'56 This is not to say
that improper communications should not be pursued or that the
resulting information should not be made available for public protection.
However, invading a teacher's privacy or restricting their actions outside
of the workplace, without corroboration and proof of some wrongdoing,

150. Id. at 358.
151. See id at 361-62.
152. Id. at 361.
153. See id.
154. See Matthew V. Munro, Access Denied: How Woznicki v. Erickson Reversed the
Statutory Presumption of Openness in the Wisconsin Open Records Law, 2002 WiS. L. REv. 1197,
1198-1200 (2002) ("The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decisions raise the issue of whether the
WORL is still good law, or whether its stated goal of openness has been superseded by the court's
more recent concern of privacy and reputational interests."); see also Ralph D. Mawdsley & James
L. Mawdsley, Commentary, Balancing Teacher Privacy With the Public's Right to Know: Bellevue
John Does v. Bellevue School District No. 405 and Public Access to Reports of Teacher Sexual
Misconduct, 242 EDUC. L. REP. I (West), at 5 (Apr. 30, 2009) (discussing how the public does not
have a legitimate interest in matters that are deemed part of a teacher's private life and "personal
information").
155. See generally Rob Frappier, Teacher Fired Over Facebook Profile, REPUTATION.COM
(Nov. 13, 2009) http://www.reputation.com/blog/2009/11/13/teacher-fired-over-facebook-profile/
("School boards are extremely sensitive to parents demands, so much so, in fact, that even the most
innocuous pictures can get a teacher fired if they're viewed in the wrong context.").
156. See Mawdsley, supra note 154, at 6-7.
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would be unjust.1 57
In Golden v. Board of Education of the County of Harrison,"' the
court addressed the issue of whether a guidance counselor could be fired
where she engaged in a "serious act of immorality" under West Virginia
law.' 59 In the opinion, the court established that unless the alleged
immoral conduct had an impact on a teacher's fitness to teach or upon
the school community, dismissing the teacher would improperly intrude
"upon the teacher's right of privacy."'160 The court further laid out
specific guidelines for drawing the line between a teacher's right to
privacy and when that right yields to the public interest.' 6 ' Conduct of a
teacher is no longer afforded privacy protections in at least two
circumstances:
(1) if the conduct directly affects the performance of the occupational
responsibilities of the teacher; or (2) if, without contribution on the
part of the school officials, the conduct has become the subject of such
notoriety as to significantly and reasonably impair the capability of the
particular teacher to discharge the responsibilities of the teaching
position. 62
The court's reasoning from this case can be applied to a situation
where a teacher is using the Internet to communicate with students. A
teacher's privacy and private activities should not be intruded upon
unless their conduct is affecting their job performance.163 How a teacher
conducts themselves in their private time, pending anything dangerous
or illegal, is not relevant to their job performance and should therefore
not be privy to others as public information or the cause of disciplinary
action against the teacher.1'" The appropriate communications that a
teacher has with his students, which do not negatively impact the
teacher's occupational effectiveness, are actually beneficial to his job
157. See Heidi M. Agustin, Massachusetts Schools Prohibit Teachers and Students From
Being
Friends
on
Facebook,
CITTowNINFO.COM
(Oct.
26,
2010)
http://www.citytowninfo.com/career-and-education-news/articles/massachusetts-schools-prohibitteachers-and-students-from-being-friends-on-facebook-10102601.
158. 285 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1981).
159. Id. at 666. The guidance counselor was arrested for felony shoplifting and pled nolo
contendere. Id News of this act was published in a local newspaper, from which the school board
learned about the incident and fired the counselor for this "serious act of immorality." Id.
160. Id. at 669.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See Michael D. Simpson, The Whole World (Wide Web) Is Watching, NAT'L EDUC.
ASS'N. http://www.nea.org/home/12784.htm. (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
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performance and should be promoted, not punished.165
In several cases, courts have refused to protect the privacy of
teachers, holding that the public's entitlement to knowledge was greater
than a teacher's right to maintaining a certain level of personal privacy.
66
For example, in Zellner v. CedarburgSchool District,1
the court held
that the public interest in protecting a teacher's privacy and reputation
did not outweigh the presumption of complete public access. 16 7 The
information at issue was a memorandum, a compact disc containing
pornographic images, and Internet searches that a teacher was alleged to
have conducted and viewed on his computer at school. 16 8 However, this
decision was greatly influenced by the facts of the case. The teacher's
violations in this instance included searching for and viewing
pornographic materials on his school computer.169 These were serious
offenses, bordering on criminal, for which the public's right to be
informed outweighed the teacher's right to privacy protections.
Linzmeyer v. Forcey articulates a common law balancing test which
further emphasizes this point.17 0 The court will weigh the harm to the
public interest from releasing the information against the public interest
in the information and the general policy of openness. 17 1 One of the
factors that could tip the scale in favor of the public interest in
maintaining privacy is protecting the reputation and honoring the
privacy interests of a citizen.17 2 When the information is not as serious
as something reaching the level of criminal, as it was in Zellner, the
public interest in valuing privacy and reputations could be enough to
overcome the presumption of the public's right to information.
The facts in Zellner are easily distinguishable from a case in which
a teacher is using social media. The teacher in Zellner was using a
school computer and time at work to engage in an activity that is highly
inappropriate for an environment filled with children.17 3 Teachers who
are using social media, even if it is to communicate with students, are
not acting in a way that is inherently improper. The teacher in Zellner

165.

John Andrius, Roles of the Teacher-Communicating, ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE FOR

TEACHERS,
http://www.teachermatters.com/classroom-management/roles-of-theteacher/communicating.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
166. 731 N.W.2d 240 (Wis. 2007).
167. Id. at 254.
168. Id. at 242.
169. Id.
170. Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 646 N.W.2d 811, 814-15 (Wis. 2002).
171. Id. at 818.
172. See id. at 820.
173. See Zellner, 731 N.W.2d at 243.
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was acting selfishly and for his own gratification, while he was supposed
to be working and educating. 17 4 When a teacher is using social media,
on his or her own time for personal relationships, it is not interfering
with his or her job as an educator and he or she is not acting
inappropriately in the work environment. Their activities on the social
media network, the majority of which do not even involve
communications with students, are personal and private.'17 As long as
the activity is not interfering with the teacher's work, or part of an
inappropriate interaction with a student, the teacher's right to privacy
should outweigh the public's right to knowledge and information. 76
The court in Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local 59 v.
Minneapolis Public Schools, Special School DistrictNo. ln17 determined

that generally, an individual does not have a privacy right to public
information.' 7 8 This means that a person cannot claim that their right to
privacy extends to information that is open to the public.' 79 The decision
discusses the reasoning from other jurisdictions, which have previously
determined that "public school teachers do not have a right to
privacy . . . ."18
The facts of those cases all involved disciplinary
reports on teachers or information in their personnel files, to which they
are not afforded the protections of privacy rights.' 8' This information
was classified as public records after the balancing test was applied and
the scales tipped in the favor of benefitting the public rather than
protecting the teacher as an employee.1 82
The reasoning is
understandable. Just as with any other profession, if a person performs
poorly or acts inappropriately, future employers would want to know. A
teacher is employed by the school district, but in a sense also works for
the public by educating society's youth.'83 Therefore any violations of
174. See id. at 242.
175. See Simpson, supranote 164.
176. See Golden v. Board of Educ., 285 S.E.2d 665, 669 (W. Va. 1981).
177. 512 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. App. 1994).
178. Id. at 110; see also, Minn. Med. Ass'n v. State., 274 N.W.2d 84, 93-94 (Minn. 1978) (the
guarantee of personal privacy is limited to rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty").
179. Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, 512 N.W.2d at 110.
180. Id. at 111; see also, Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576, 581 (5th Cir.1987);
Brouillet v. Cowles Publishing Co., 791 P.2d 526, 531-32 (Wash.1990); Hovet v. Hebron Pub. Sch.
Dist., 419 N.W.2d 189, 190-91 (N.D. 1988).
181. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 F.2d at 581; Brouillet, 791 P.2d at 531-32; Hovet, 419
N.W.2d at 190-91.
182. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 F.2d at 581; Brouillet, 791 P.2d at 531-32; Hovet, 419
N.W.2d at 190-91.
183. See Who Is Accountable for Children's Education?, BY THE PEOPLE: AMERICA INTHE
WORLD 5, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/btp/pdfs/stlouis-accountability_2005.pdf (last visited Apr.
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their duties are rightfully subjected to public scrutiny. 184 An instance
where a teacher is using social media or the Internet is distinguishable.
The teacher's activities outside of the classroom do not require public
evaluation when they are unrelated to the effectiveness of the teacher as
an educator.' 8 5 If the teacher's actions amount to something harmful or
illegal, such as the sexual harassment that the Missouri legislature was
so apprehensive of, then the teacher places himself in the public eye
willingly by committing a crime that will be prosecuted in open court,
and the issue of breaching privacy protections does not even need to be
raised. Apart from unfortunate circumstances such as those, or activities
that impact the teacher's job performance, intruding on a teacher's
personal life is unnecessary.
While a teacher's expected right to privacy in their actions outside
the classroom is one of possible protections that may be invoked against
this law, it is not the exclusive argument. Teachers facing the looming
threat of the Amy Hestir Act clamping down on their social media
activities have another valuable protection through utilizing the
Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. AMY HESTIR AND THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT

The Amy Hestir Student Protection Act and other similar
regulations clearly intend to protect students from unfit teachers.'
Courts have long held that the state as an employer has the power to
investigate whether a teacher who has been hired is fit to teach. 187 This
is due to the teacher's role in educating the minds of their students and
helping them prepare to function in our society.18 8 The Court has also
held that "[t]here is 'no requirement in the Federal Constitution that a
teacher's classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining his fitness.
Fitness for teaching depends on a broad range of factors."" 89 However,
22, 2012).
184. Kim McGuire, Like Never Before, Teachers Under Scrutiny, STARTRIBUNE (Mar. 25,

2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/stpaul/144099296.html.
185. See Eric Ringham, Should Employers Be Able to Regulate Your Personal Life?
MPRNEWS
(July
14,
2009,
6:00
AM),

http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns/todaysquestion/archive/2009/07/should-employers-be-able-to-regulate-your-personal-life.shtml.
186. See Student Abused By Jr.High School Teacher, supranote 25.
187. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960).
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Beilan v. Bd. of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 406 (1958)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 8

286

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:263

while the Court has accepted the authority of the government to check
the fitness of a teacher, this ability has not been made absolute. 190
"[E]ven though the governmental purpose [may] be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."' 9 '
A. The FourteenthAmendment's Due Process Clause and the
Incorporationof the Freedom ofAssociation
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution contains within it
the guarantee that no state shall deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or
property without the due process of law.' 92 Through this provision, the
Supreme Court determined that certain rights contained within the Bill
of Rights could be applied to the states.1 9 3 Through the doctrine of
incorporation, the Supreme Court has applied a majority of the rights
guaranteed through the Bill of Rights to the states.194 It is the right of
the freedom of association in particular that is integral to the discussion
of the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act. Interestingly, this right is not
explicitly stated anywhere in the First Amendment,' 95 the amendment
courts would later use as the building block to create this right.
It was not until the Supreme Court case of NAACP v. Alabama ex
190. See id. at 488.
19 1. Id.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
193. See generally Adamson v. Cal., 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (setting forth a description on the
doctrine of selective incorporation which may be used to apply rights within the first eight
amendments to the states), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964)
(rejecting the suggestion in Adamson that only very limited provision of Bill of Rights could be
applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
194. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of press); Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(establishment of religion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of religion);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); McDonald v. City of Chicago,
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (right to bear arms); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (unreasonable
search and seizure); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (warrant requirement for searches);
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Malloy, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (selfincrimination); Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
(takings clause); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial and notice of accusations); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (trial by jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(right against cruel and unusual punishment).
195. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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rel. Patterson'96 that the right to free association was recognized and
applied to the states. 197 An Alabama statute required that, before doing
business within the state, foreign corporations file their charters with the
secretary of state, designate a place of business, and appoint an agent to
receive service of process.'"
The National Association for
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which had been active in
Alabama since 1918, opened up a regional office within the state in 1951
without fulfilling the state statute's requirements. 199 The state Attorney
General filed suit against the NAACP for this violation and sought an
injunction as prescribed by the statute.2 0 0 During the preliminary stages
of the action, the State requested and was given the right by the court to
obtain a list of all members and agents in Alabama who were affiliated
with the NAACP. 2 0 1 After refusing to turn over the list of members, the
NAACP was found in contempt of court and fined.202
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the
imposition of the fine by the lower court against the NAACP.20 3 In
handing down this decision, the Court took up the argument advanced by
the NAACP that the lower court's order of disclosing its membership list
would have been an unconstitutional infringement upon the right to
freedom of association.204 Beginning its discussion on the issue, the
Court declared "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of
view ... is undeniably enhanced by group association . . . ."20 5 The
ability of a person to freely associate for the advancement of their ideas
was one that the Court held was without question a protected liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.206 The Court
asserted further that the right to association was vitally tied to one's
privacy in associations. 207 Any action taken by the State that had a
curtailing effect upon this right would be held to a level of "the closest
196. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
197. Id at 460-61
198. Id. at 451.
199. Id. at 452.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 453.
202. Id. at 453-54.
203. Id. at 454, 466.
204. Id. at 460, 462.
205. Id. at 460.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 462. "Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy
of particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a
group espouses dissident beliefs." Id
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scrutiny." 208 The Court even cautioned that actions which were not
intended to infringe upon such a right could be held as an
unconstitutional infringement, whether perpetrated by the legislature or
the judiciary. 20 9 Regardless of who the actor for the State is, the interest
served by the infringement upon the right must be compelling in the eyes
of the Court. 210 Applying this compelling interest test, the Court found
that the State's need for the membership list in order to prove the
NAACP was carrying on intrastate business did not meet this
threshold.211 While NAACP cemented the existence of freedom of
association and its application to the states, it would require another
decision of the Supreme Court to crystalize how this right would apply
to the teaching profession.
B. A Teacher's Right to FreeAssociation

The Supreme Court would not have to wait long to apply this newly
recognized right to state teachers. Merely two years later, the case of
Shelton v. Tucker 212 came before the Court, requiring it to weigh in on
the free association rights of public schoolteachers.213 As discussed
previously, 214 this case concerned an Arkansas statute that required an
individual looking to become a superintendent, principal or teacher had
to file an affidavit with the appropriate authority, before they were hired
or requested continuing employment.215 In this affidavit, the individual
had to list all organizations they were currently in or had been in for the
last five years and all organizations they were making contributions to or
had made contributions to for the past five years.216 Along with the
restriction on hiring imposed by this statute, if an individual lied on the
affidavit they would be subject to fines and the loss of their teaching
license.217 In spite of this requirement, B. T. Shelton, a teacher in Little
Rock, refused to file the affidavit leading to a failure to renew his
contract.2 18
208. Id. at 460-61.
209. See id.at 461, 463.
210. See id at 463 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957).
211. See id at 464-66.
212. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
at479.
213. See id.
214. See supra Part III.
215. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 480.
216. Id. at 480-81.
217. Id. at 481.
218. Id. at 482-83. The companion case to Shelton was that of Max Carr, a professor at the
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After this adverse action, Shelton brought suit in district court,
arguing the Arkansas statute was a violation of state teachers' right to
freedom of association that was protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 19 In beginning of its discussion, the Court
stressed the importance of a state's interest in assuring the competence
of the teachers it employs.220 Categorizing this interest as a "'vital
concern"' 2 2 1 the Court held there is no requirement that "a teacher's
classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining his fitness. Fitness
for teaching depends on a broad range of factors."22 2 Holding this
concern of the state in such high regard, the Court felt the situation was
noticeably different than that of NAACP, for here there existed a
substantial relevancy between the State's need for organization lists and
determining a teacher's competency.22 3 However, the Court then went
on to weigh the importance of protecting constitutional rights within the
U.S. school system, indicating that there may even be a "vigilant
protection" requirement for those rights.224 The Court even went so far
as to state that:
By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech
and freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling. But, in
view of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective exercise of
the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the
Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of
action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of
those amendments vividly into operation. Such unwarranted inhibition
upon the free spirit of teachers ... has an unmistakable tendency to
chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to
cultivate and practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their

University of Arkansas and Ernest T. Gephardt, a teacher at a Little Rock High school. Id. at 484.
Both refused to file the affidavit required by the statute opting instead to allow the institutions to
question them on matters that would concern their qualifications as teachers. Id. Both were warned
of the consequences of the refusal and elected to bring a suit in state court which they ultimately
lost. Id.
219. Id at 482, 484-85.
220. Id. at 485 ("There can be no doubt of the right of a State to investigate the competence
and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools, as this Court before now has had occasion
to recognize.").
221. Id. (quoting Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952), overruled in part by
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).
222. Id. (quoting Beilan v. Bd. of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 406 (1958)).
223. See id.
224. Id. at 487.
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associations by potential teachers. 225
The Court further explained that in order for both teachers and
students to excel and grow in an educational environment, that
environment must be free of state suspicion.22 6 This does not mean,
however, that states cannot ask teachers about their associational ties.227
Instead, the Court was troubled by the extraordinary breadth of the
statute in what it would require teachers to disclose.228 The Court
surmised that the statute would require teachers to disclose what church
they attended, political party they belonged to, and every other
conceivable association they may have a tie with. 22 9 The Court reasoned
that such a broad imposition could not possibly be narrowly tailored to
the state's goal of ensuring teacher competency, and thus failed the
requirements of strict scrutiny. 230
While Shelton only held that ensuring teacher competency was a
compelling state interest, the Court has also consistently found that
protecting children from sexual abuse is similarly compelling.2 3 1
However, while this interest is compelling, the statute used to fulfill this
interest must still be narrowly tailored in order to be upheld by the
Court. 23 2 With the holdings of the Court thoroughly discussed, they may
now be applied to the situation created by the Amy Hestir Student
Protection Act.
C. Applying Strict Scrutiny to the Amy HestirAct
The first step in applying the judicial analysis of strict scrutiny to
the Amy Hestir Act is to look at the reasoning behind the Act to
determine whether or not it is a compelling state interest. The stated
purpose of the bill was to protect the minor students of Missouri from
sexual abuse perpetrated by school employees.2 33 Looking at the

225. Id. (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring)).
226. See id
227. Id.
228. See id. at 487-88.
229. Id. at 488.
230. See id
231. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982); Aid for Women
v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1119 (10th Cir. 2006).
232. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-08 ("[A]s compelling as that interest is, it does
not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case may
affect the significance of the interest.").
233. Cunningham Press Release, supra note 13.
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language and the history of the statute, it is likely that a court would find
the stated purpose of this bill was genuinely to protect children from
sexual abuse and it is not being argued that this is not the case. Even
those who argue that the Amy Hestir Act is unconstitutional support the
ultimate goal of the Missouri legislature.2 34 This then means that under
the holdings of cases such as Global Newspaper, which recognized the
protection of children from sexual abuse as compelling,2 35 the Amy
Hestir Act would be found to have a compelling state interest.
With the first requirement of strict scrutiny met, the final step in the
analysis is to determine whether the Amy Hestir Act was narrowly
tailored to fulfill this interest. In looking at section 162.069 of the Amy
Hestir Student Protection Act, it becomes clear why this act is not
narrowly tailored. It is explicitly stated in the statute that "[n]o teacher
shall establish, maintain, or use a nonwork-related website that allows
exclusive access with a current or former student." 2 36 The term that
plays the biggest part in the analysis of whether or not the statute is
narrowly tailored is "exclusive access." The statute indicates that this
happens when information on the site is "available only to the owner
(teacher) and user (student) by mutual explicit consent and where third
parties have no access to the information on the website absent an
explicit consent agreement with the owner (teacher) ....
Using this definition of "exclusive access" there is a seemingly
infinite array of sites that may be subject to this rule. Going with the
prime example first, a social media site such as Facebook, which
requires permission to see other users profiles unless a person has made
their page "public." 238 This fits the statute's mold perfectly as students
and teachers could mutually consent to having access to each other's
profile while administrators or parents would only have access if the
teacher consented to such an action. However, could a teacher use an
instant messaging 239 service run on a website to communicate with
234. See Tim Barker, Backlash Over Missouri's 'FacebookLaw', ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH
(Aug. 10, 2011, 12:12 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/article_048b2b2f-04b4576f-b878-b8080800e94e.html.
235. See GlobalNewspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
236. S. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).
237. Id.
238. A function of the security settings on Facebook is to allow the user to choose whether
they will allow their Facebook profile to be viewable by the general public without specific consent
by the user, or keep their profile private which requires the user to give other users permission to
access the content of their page.
239. A program or service that allows two or more users to communicate with each other
through text windows which contain typed messages by the users sent directly to the other users.
See What is Instant Messaging? WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-instant-
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students? These sorts of programs allow for "exclusive access" between
teachers and students, and also deny access to other third parties unless
the teacher allows them to see or be a part of the conversation. 240 Would
this sort of service be considered a "website" under the statute? Would
it depend on if it was a program or an online service?
The problems do not end with the question of whether something is
considered a website that allows for "exclusive access." Would this
statute apply to teachers communicating with students who are their
children? The statute merely provides that teachers may not have a
website that allows them to have exclusive access to a current or former
student. 24 1 This would most certainly mean that a parent who is a
teacher communicating with his or her child who is, or was, a student
over a website such as Facebook has violated the Amy Hestir Act.242
This sort of outcome could not be a better indication that this law has an
effect far too extreme to realistically claim it narrowly serves the goals
of the state. In this instance parents would be prevented from
communicating with their family merely because they are a teacher and
a website allows them, in the abstract, to communicate exclusively with
students.243
This problem is aggregated by the fact that in modem American
society a person's ability to use social networking sites like Facebook to
create and maintain relationships has become pivotal. 2 " It is no longer
the case that individuals only meet face-to-face or over the phone, but
instead do so through utilizing social media to communicate with
others.245 Millions of people will use social media sites for activities
such as chatting with their friends or viewing pictures their friends have
posted on their webpage.246 With such websites becoming so integral to
the maintenance of a social life, the state, through this statute, has
effectively socially isolated teachers.2 47 This forces teachers into a tough
situation of choosing between their jobs or their social media

messaging.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
240. See id
241. S. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).
242. See Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 55 at 3.
243. See id.
244. See Somini Sengupta, HalfofAmerica is Using Social Networks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26,
2011 7:30 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/half-of-america-is-using-social-networks/.
245. See id.
246. See FACEBOOK, supra note 9.
247. See Barker, supra note 234 (stating that Missouri's law will prevent teachers from
communicating with students and may scare teachers away from using social media entirely).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss1/8

30

Baez and Caufield: Drawing a Line in the Shifting Sand of Social Media: Attempting t

SHIFTING SAND OFSOCIAL MEDIA

2012]

293

248

connections.
Yet, the government is seeking to protect children from sexual
abuse. 249 However, creating an all-out ban on teachers having such
social media websites goes beyond this purpose.250 Similar to the
mandatory list of associations in Shelton, the Missouri legislature has
cast a net so wide that it is going to infringe rights and effect teachers in
such a way that is not related to protecting children from sexual abuse. 25 1
This law requires all Missouri teachers to abstain from all social media
sites in order to protect children.2 52 This is strikingly similar to Shelton's
requirement of all teachers to communicate all associations to which
they belong. Just as the court marveled at the breadth of the requirement
in Shelton, it would likely be just as amazed at the amount of ground
covered by the Amy Hestir Act.253
Further, the danger of stifling the educational environment with
State suspicion as warned in Shelton is evident in this instance. The
State is so suspicious of the teachers in its school system that it is going
to deny them all access to amenities required to have an active social
life.254 This level of restraint on teachers goes far beyond that needed to
protect children,255 thus this Act is not narrowly tailored and would fail
the second requirement of strict scrutiny.
Along with the complications posed by the right of freedom of
association, the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act bares striking
similarities to other state limitations on teacher's actions. In looking at
case law that deals with comparable problems that may be faced in
enforcing the Amy Hestir Act, further flaws in the statute can be spotted
and used to weaken Missouri's already failing law.

248. See Mark Guarino, Can Facebook Get Teachers Fired?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Aug. 23, 2011, 7:35 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0823/Can-Facebook-get-teachersfired.
249. See id
250. See Kashmir Hill, Why Missouri's Ban on Teacher-Student Facebook Friendships is
Doomed,
FORBES
(Aug.
8,
2011,
1:56
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/08/08/why-missouris-ban-on-teacher-studentfacebook-friendships-is-doomed/.
251. See Guarino, supra note 248 (stating that banning teachers from Facebook may not stop
sexual abuse and may only serve to drive child abusers to use more direct methods such as private
and phone communication).
252. See id.
253. See Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 62, at 2 (holding that the "breadth
of the prohibition is staggering.").
254. See Barker, supranote 234.
255. See Hill, supra note 250.
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V. OTHER SITUATIONS INWHICH TEACHERS COMMUNICATE WITH
STUDENTS, AND HOW THE MISSOURI LAW APPLIES TO THEM
Missouri is not the only state attempting to deal with the complex
issue of communications between teachers and their students.256 Other
jurisdictions in various regions have enacted regulations seeking to
affect similar activities targeted by the Amy Hestir Student Protection
Act, and their effects can be used to measure the consequences of the
Missouri statute. By comparing the facts of these similar cases to the
statute at hand, a clear assessment of the broadness of the Amy Hestir
Student Protection Act, and its constitutionality, or lack thereof, can be
made. Comparable statutes can also serve as a template for the Missouri
legislature to use when redrafting the statute to ensure that they do not
make the same mistakes twice. Through observance of the mistakes or
successes in other jurisdictions, the drafters can compile a regulation that
encompasses all of the necessary protections for students without the
restrictions on teachers' freedoms.
Chivers v. Central Noble Community Schools257 is a case from
Indiana where a teacher was communicating with his students outside of
class.258 The teacher had been previously warned against contacting
students over the Internet, because such action was frowned upon by the
school officials. 259 Rumors about the teacher's Internet conversations
with a student prompted an investigation by school officials, but the
school principal concluded that there was no inappropriate behavior on
the part of the teacher. 26 0 This case is distinguishable from any that
would be brought under the Missouri statute, because there was no
codified restriction preventing teachers from communicating with
students over the Internet. However, it stands for the proposition that
conversations between students and teachers outside of the classroom
should not automatically receive the stigma of being inappropriate. The
reasoning behind the creation of the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act
is supported by an assumption that communications between students
and teachers are likely to be inappropriate if they take place outside of

256.
Media?,

See Patrik Jonsson, Will Missouri 'Facebook Law' Spook Teachers Away From Social
CHRISTIAN

Sel.

MONITOR

(Aug.

3,

2011),

http://www.csmonitor.comi/USA/2011/0803/Will-Missouri-Facebook-Law-spook-teachers-awayfrom-social-media.
257. 423 F.Supp.2d 835 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
258. Id. at 841-42.
259. See id. at 846.
260. See id
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the classroom. 2 6 ' The Chivers case makes it clear that that assumption is
not true.
26 2
In State v. Ebersold,
a teacher was brought up on charges of
verbally communicating a "harmful description or narrative account to a
child."2 63 The teacher was sending sexually explicit messages to one of
his students in an Internet chat room. 2 64 The Court of Appeals in
Wisconsin held that the statute prohibiting the communication of
harmful descriptions or narrative accounts could be applied to an
Internet chat message, despite it not actually being verbal expression.265
The court took the liberty to construe the statute in a way that they saw
fit, in order to punish the teacher for his inappropriate actions. This case
demonstrates that there are other ways of constructing laws to protect
students from predatory teachers, without restricting teachers' use of
social media and the Internet. This Wisconsin statute is a perfect
example of statutory language that protects students, without infringing
on teachers' constitutional rights. It proves that with some effort, the
Missouri legislature could redraft the law to fulfill its purpose, without
constricting the freedoms of the teachers.
Teachers in Missouri have maintained that the Amy Hestir Student
Protection Act is a clear infliction on their First Amendment right to free
speech. However, the link between communications over the Internet
and a constitutional protection may not be entirely clear. In Snyder v.
Millersville University, a student teacher was denied her certification,
allegedly because of certain web pages that were discovered about her
on the Internet.267 The evaluator in charge of her during her student
teaching claimed that she lacked professionalism, and needed to better
grasp the boundaries between students and teachers.26 8 It was clear in
this case that the concern was not about an inappropriate sexual
relationship, but the lack of an authoritative relationship. 26 9 Regardless,
the Internet posting and efforts to communicate with students through
MySpace were used as support for the denial of her certification.2 70 The
plaintiff claimed that the First Amendment entitled her to freely express
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See Jonsson, supra note 256.
742 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 877.
Id.
See id. at 879-81.
No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
Id.

268.

See id. at *4, *8.

269.

See id. at *4.

270.

See id. at *5-*8.
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herself over the Internet, and that failing to recommend her based on
information about her on the Internet was essentially a restriction of her
freedom of expression. 2 7' The court disagreed, stating that this was not
considered a First Amendment violation, because the plaintiffs status as
a teacher made her subject only to freedom of speech that touched on
public concern.27 2 The student teacher's website posting was not a
"speech" that touched on matters of public concern.27 3 Instead, the
information on the Internet was regarding personal matters on her
MySpace page, which does not fall under the protections of the First
Amendment when teachers are concerned.2 74 This case establishes the
rule that a First Amendment freedom of speech claim is only applicable
in instances where a teacher's expressions are in regards to a matter of
public concern.275 Had the student teacher posted something that could
have been deemed related to a matter of public concern, her speech
could have been protected under the First Amendment. 76
The teachers in Missouri, whose lives have been drastically
impacted by the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, can take some
comfort in the outcomes of these cases. The court in Chivers established
the principle that not all communications between students and teachers
are improper.2 77 The drafters of the Missouri statute clearly intended to
protect school children from being taken advantage of by their
teachers.27 8 The legislature was under the impression that allowing
communications between students and teachers, outside of the
classroom, would make students vulnerable to sexual predators
masquerading as molders of minds. 2 79 However, the Chivers case
proves that this assumption is overreaching. Teachers and students
should be able to interact with each other without the negative stigma of
molestation hanging over their heads. The teacher in Chivers was not
punished for his interactions with students outside of the classroom,
because it was clear that they were not inappropriately sexual in
nature. 2 80 This same leeway should be allowed with all student-teacher
communications.
271.
272.

See id at *10.
Id.at *14.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See id at*16.
Id.
See id. at*14.
See id. at *14-*16.
See Chivers v. Cent. Noble Cmty. Sch., 423 F. Supp. 2d 835, 856-57 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
Cunningham Press Release, supra note 13.
See id
Chivers, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 856.
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Furthermore, Ebersold provides a clear example of how the
Missouri legislature can redraft the law to protect both their interests and
the interests of the teachers.28 1 In that case, a teacher sent sexually
explicit messages to one of his students, and was charged under a state
statute that prohibited harmful communications between teachers and
students.2 82
The statute was specifically worded to prevent
communications of harmful descriptions or narrative accounts. 283 The
court indicated that the purpose behind statutory interpretation is to
allow for the policy choices of the legislature to shine through.284 The
Missouri legislature, in their zealousness to come to the aid and
protection of abused students, may have overstepped their bounds.
Instead of creating a narrow regulation like that in Ebersold," which
could be used to punish teachers who use the internet as a pathway to
sexual abuse, the legislature wrote an overly broad law that prevents
teachers from using the Internet to efficiently promote the learning
process.
The Amy Hestir Student Protection Act is not unique in its purpose.
Other similar regulations have been created before, and others will be
enacted in the future. There is great value in this history, because the
Missouri legislature can learn from it. It has been clearly established
that as it stands now, the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act is
ineffective and unconstitutional. However, this is not to say that the
reasoning and principles behind it are not important. The Missouri
legislature needs to re-write this statute, but only after careful evaluation
of previous regulations and consideration for the rights of the teachers.
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE AMY HESTIR STUDENT PROTECTION
ACT

While the motivation behind the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act
was admirable, the language of the statute and the overzealousness of the
legislatures led to illogical restrictions on teachers. In their enthusiasm
to protect students from sexual abuse by their teachers, the legislatures
drafted an incredibly broad statute, which imposed upon the rights of
teachers far more than it protected the safety of their students. The
purpose behind the statute was clear; however the execution was faulty
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See generallyState v. Ebersold, 742 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 877-78.
See id. at 878.
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and thus can be improved upon. The following proposed statute
continues to focus on the safety of students and the prevention of sexual
abuses, but includes altered portions of the original statute, and several
new sections, in order to lessen the burden the law will impose on
teachers.
A. ProposedDraft of the New Statute
Below is a draft of the proposed changes to the relevant portion of
the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act. A definitions section has been
added to better clarify the breadth and depth of the restrictions placed on
teachers, and to help eliminate gray areas that might cause confusion as
to what exactly teachers are allowed to do. There are also adjustments
made to the language of certain sections, to maintain the same level of
protection for students against sexual abuse, but to prevent undue
burdens on the rights and abilities of teachers.
Section 1
Definitions
A) Enhanced Authority. Enhanced authority is any authority
above what a teacher is normally granted in the normal course of their
employment. 286
B) Non- Work Related Site. A non-work relatedinternet site is any
internetwebsite or web page which is not owned, operated or
maintainedby the school, school districtor school administration.
C) Private Communication. Private communication is any
communication between a teacher and student that is not subject to
supervision by a school administratorand the parent/legal guardian of
the student.
D) Relative. A relative is a person who is connected to the student
through blood, marriage or domestic partnership.
E) School Administrator. A school administrator is a state
employee who has received certification and was hiredfor the purpose
ofsupervising andmaintainingthe daily operations of one or more
schools. Such positions may include but are not limited to: principals,
school superintendents, and school comptrollers.
F) Work Related Internet Site. A work relatedInternet site is any
Internet website or web page which is owned, operated or maintained by

286. Italicized portions of this proposed statute indicate language that was changed from the
original version, or new sections that were added. All other language is consistent with the original
version of the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act.
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the school, school district or school administration,to which the school,
school districtor school administrationhas primary access.
Section 2
Each school district must formulate their own written policy,
concerning teacher-student and employee-student communications. The
new policies must contain, at the very least, the following elements:
A) Appropriate oral and non-verbal communication (can be
combined with policies on sexual harassment); and
B) Appropriate use of electronic media such as text messaging and
Internet sites for both instructional and personal purposes, with an
element concerning use of social networking sites that specifically
adheres to the provisions provided in subsections of this section.
C) No teacher shall establish, maintain or use a work-related
Internet site unless such site is available to school administrators and the
student's guardian(s).
1) Any non-work related Internet site which is used by a teacher
primarily to support the curriculum and further the education of their
students may be treatedas a work-related Internet site, as long as the
school administrationgives their express permission in writing.
D) No teacher shall use a non-work related Internet site to
communicateprivately with a current or former student, except when:
1) The teacher is a relative of the student.
2) The teacher has enhanced authority over an aspect of the
student's education, which has been granted by the school
administrationand the parent/legalguardianof the student.
a) Any private communications that occur pursuant to this
exception must be available to the school administration and the
parent/legalguardianof the student.
b) Any teacher with enhancedauthority who fails to make private
communications availableto the school administrationand the
parent/legalguardianof thestudent shall not be covered under this
exception.
3) A teacherwithout enhanced authorityhas been given permission,
by the parent/legalguardian of a student, to privately communicate with
that student.
a) The permission must be granted in writing, filed with the
school administration,and kept on recordby the school administration.
b) The student's parent/legalguardianhas the exclusive right to
revoke the permission for private communication any time after it has
been granted. This must be done through an additionalwriting, which
is submitted to the school administration,and kept on record by the
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school administration.
E) Any teacher who has violated Section 2(D) shall be subject to
investigation by the school administration and may face disciplinary
actions which may include but is not limited to reprimand,suspension or
terminationby the school administration.
1) This provision is not to be construed as the exclusive remedy for
a teacher's violation of this statute. A teacher who has violated Section
2(D) of this statute is also subject to all other criminal and civil
penaltiesas mandated by other state andfederal laws and regulations.
Section 3
If a school or school district is found to not be in compliance with
the standards set forth in Section 2, the school administratorfor that
school or school district will be subject to disciplinary action, which
may include but is not limited to investigation, reprimand,suspension or
termination by their supervisor.
A) A school administratorwho has violatedSection 3 of this statute
is also subject to all other criminal and civil penalties as mandated by
other state andfederal laws and regulations.
B. Analysis of the Revised Statute
In order to reform the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, it is
important to break down the statute by section and carefully analyze the
language. The definitions section provides a list of clear and concise
terms, which were not available to readers in the first version of the
statute. 287 By outlining exactly what meaning was intended to apply to
the diction used in the statute, the various sections themselves are
clarified. The school administrators and teachers who are required to
follow the statutory restrictions will be able to clearly and easily identify
what is expected of them, and what actions they must be careful to
avoid.
One of the most important distinctions the definitions section adds
is the difference between a work related Internet site and a non-work
related Internet site.28 The ability to easily determine which Internet
sites are considered "work related," and which ones are not, is important
for teachers and school administrators because it clarifies which sites can
be used to communicate with students. This lucidity will help to prevent
misunderstandings by teachers on the methods they can use to
287.

See supra Section 1 of the Proposed Statute.

288.

See supra Sections 1(B), (F) of the Proposed Statute.
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communicate with students, and which avenues are considered
inappropriate. It also makes clear to school administrators which
Internet sites they should monitor closely, and which sites are private
and should not be investigated.
Work related sites are limited by this definition to specifically
exclude social networking sites, 289 in order to prevent these websites
from being monitored by school administrators and to provide teachers
with some assurance of privacy in their personal lives. It was also
important to define exactly what a private communication was for the
same reasons. 2 90 Schoolteachers need clear guidelines of what is
allowed verses what is prohibited when communicating with students, so
that no accidental violations are made. Furthermore, a concise definition
will help to discourage unnecessary confrontations between teachers and
school administrators over controversial communications.
The definitions section also contains descriptions of what
"enhanced authority" and "relative" mean.291 These terms are important
in understanding certain exceptions that have been added into the statute.
Teachers and school administrators alike need a concrete understanding
of who has "enhanced authority" or who is a "relative" of a student, in
order to establish permission for certain communications under those
exceptions. Without exact descriptions of these terms, the exceptions
would be far too flexible. This would defeat the purpose of the
reconstructed statute, which intends to protect both the rights of teachers,
and students from harm.
The second section of the revised statute contains some of the old
language, complemented by many additional provisions.2 92 Part A
remains the same, because it establishes the most important premise
within the statute.293 Teachers and other school officials are prohibited
from having any inappropriate communications with students. This
section calls for the creation of school policies outlining which verbal
and non-verbal communications are appropriate, and which must be
restricted.2 94 It also suggests that these policies be combined with those
on sexual harassment.2 95 This proposal is logical, because the elements
that define communications as appropriate or not will likely be

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra Section 1(F) of the Proposed Statute.
See supra Section 1(C) of the Proposed Statute..
See supra Sections 1(A), (D) of the Proposed Statute
See supra Section 2 of the Proposed Statute.
See supra Section 2(A) of the Proposed Statute
See id.
See id.
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inextricably linked to instances of sexual harassment.
Part B remains mostly the same, other than a small change to the
syntax that standardizes the level of stringency of the schools'
policies.296 Rather than saying that each school's policy must be at least
as strict as the statute lays out, the revised provisions in the statute are
redrafted to depict the desired level of strictness. This encourages
clarity, and prevents schools from passing overly restrictive policies.
Part C was left the same, with the exception of clarifying what is a
work related site in the definitions portion.29 7 An exception was also
added under this section, allowing teachers to use non-work related sites
to communicate with students, if the primary purpose of the site was to
further student education in compliance with the curriculum. 2 98 This
exception was necessary because of the way in which work related sites
were defined. Work related sites are only those that are essentially
controlled by the school administration. Therefore, if a teacher wanted
to use another Internet page, such as a class blog, a webpage that played
videos, or even a website that was meant to be used in tandem with one
of the text books, they technically would not be able to under the
allowance for usage of work related sites. This exception gives teachers
the freedom to explore the best methods for furthering their students'
educations, while still offering the protections of administrative approval
and supervision.
Part D contains the most edits, because it concerns private
communications between students and teachers, which is arguably the
largest area of concern when aiming to prevent sexual harassment.29 9
The revision includes certain scenarios where private communications
using non-work related Internet sites would normally be considered
appropriate, and therefore exceptions should be granted. For example, if
a teacher is also the parent or relative of the student,3 00 the threat of
sexual harassment is greatly diminished. Even if there was still a threat,
it is doubtful that the sexual relationship would culminate through
Internet communication, because the student and teacher are already
acquainted in a more intimate nature: their familial relationship.
There is also an exception for teachers who are given enhanced
authority regarding certain students. 301 This exception was important,
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section

2(B) of the Proposed Statute.
2(C) of the Proposed Statute.
2(C)(1) of the Proposed Statute.
2(D) of the Proposed Statute.
2(D)(1) of the Proposed Statute.
2(D)(2) of the Proposed Statute.
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because the purpose behind that enhanced authority is normally to
promote learning, and restricting the teacher's ability to communicate
with the student could be counterproductive. However, it is also
possible that relationships such as these make students more susceptible
to sexual abuse. Therefore, along with the exception is the requirement
that private communications be made available to the school
administration and parents/guardian of the student. 302 This way, the
school is not limiting communication, but has the ability to monitor,
which is a necessary precaution. Finally, there is a basic catch-all
exception, which grants the ability for private communication to any
teacher who receives permission from the student's parent/legal
guardian.3 03 This exception is meant to cover any unforeseen situations
that escaped our foresight during revisions, while still maintaining a
level of protection to prevent harm to the students.
Part E of the statute provides the roadmap as to what the
ramifications are to be for a teacher who has violated this statute.304
This section was lacking in the Amy Hestir Act and serves as a guide for
school administrators in determining how to proceed when a teacher
violates the policies set forth. When it is discovered that a teacher has
made a private communication with a student, the school administration
is to first investigate the communication. This is to underscore the
importance to be placed upon what the teacher actually said to the
student in the private communication. Innocent conversation or a simple
errant message would violate the statute, but after the investigation could
be disregarded as harmless and unworthy of further action. However, if
an investigation turned up something more sinister or sexual, the school
administrator has all the options of the statute and more at his or her
disposal. This set-up places the emphasis on what was actually said or
the number of private communications a teacher has had with students
before doling out punishment. This scheme fits nicely with the objective
of protecting students from sexual abuse and not merely banning all
conversation between teacher and student.
Part E also contains a disclaimer as to the full ramifications of a
teacher's unauthorized private communication with a student.30 s Part E
of section 2 is not the sole remedy of any student, parent/legal guardian
or school administrator for violations of this statute. Along with the
possible disciplinary actions that can be taken against a teacher pursuant
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section

2(D)(2)(a) of the Proposed Statute.
2(D)(3) of the Proposed Statute.
2(E) of the Proposed Statute.
2(E)(1) of the Proposed Statute.
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to part E, the teacher is also subject to criminal and civil liabilities for
his or her actions. This warning is necessary to show that the conduct of
a teacher merely contacting a student is not the only target of sexual
abuse statutes. Section D of the statute is just the first inquiry into the
suspected action. If a teacher for example communicates material
prohibited by state or federal law, he or she is subject to punishment
under part E as well as that state or federal law. Part E(1) is a necessary
precaution to ensure no teacher can be shielded from other liability by
being punished under this provision and reinforces the need to focus on
the actual conduct when investigating a violation of part D.
The final section of the revised statute provides punishments for the
school administrators if any of the provisions are not enacted in the
school district.3 0 6 This section was missing in the original version of the
statute, which left school administrators without a clear example of the
consequences for not ensuring that the newly enacted proposed statute
and the policies it mandated would be enacted by the school districts.
Furthermore, it increased the vulnerability of school administrators,
because there was no proposed limit to what the repercussions for
violating the statute could be.
Under section 3 of the proposed statute, school administrators now
know that they are subject to discipline for non-compliance. Further,
under part A of section 3, school administrators are also warned of the
civil and criminal liabilities they may face for their non-compliance.307
This part is almost a word for word copy of the warning given to
teachers for violating section 2(D). As previously stated, this disclaimer
acts as a warning to school administrators that the proposed statute will
not act as a shield for additional liability stemming from other state and
federal violations. As with a teacher, a school administrator may be
punished subject to section 3 and any relevant state or federal law or
regulation.
C How the ProposedStatute Holds up Under the Criticismsof Amy
Hestir
Throughout this paper, there have been multiple fronts upon which
the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act has been attacked and reasoning
given as to why it should be deemed invalid. The proposed statute must
be put through the same evaluation, to determine how well it addresses
306.
307.

See supra Section 3 of the Proposed Statute.
See supra Section 3(A) of the Proposed Statute.
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the problems with the statute it seeks to replace.
1. Restrictions on the Private Lives of Employees
As stated earlier in Part III, the Amy Hestir Act would be
susceptible to challenge on the ground that its broad infringement on the
private actions of schoolteachers was a violation of their right to privacy
and public policy. 30 8 However, unlike the Amy Hestir Act, the proposed
statute does not have the same far sweeping reach as seen in the
Missouri statute. Under section 2 of the proposed statute, a teacher
would only be in violation of the statute if they used a non-worked
related site to communicate with students, not merely having a non-work
related site as under Amy Hestir. Such a reduction in scope of coverage
would certainly meet the requirements of Shelton and American
Federation,in which the court struck down state restrictions it felt were
overbroad and gave the states excessive control over its employees. The
proposed statute would also meet the fair dealing and connection to job
performance requirement of Rulon. By limiting the scope of the focus to
actual unauthorized private conversations between teachers and students,
the state is in a better position to argue that this action had a negative
impact upon their ability to teach. Thus, it would be easier to argue to a
court that a disciplinary action was justified.
The proposed statute would also be able to meet the standards set
under the public policy argument put forward in Part III. First, under the
two part test set forth in Missoulian, a teacher once put on notice that
their unauthorized private conversations with students are no longer
private; they would no longer have a subjective expectation of
privacy. 309 The stronger distinction between the proposed statute and
Amy Hestir however, flows from the second prong of the test. While the
Amy Hestir Act fails under this prong because society would recognize a
teacher's right to privacy in being able to have a social media account,
the proposed statute has no similar shortcoming. Society is not likely to
recognize as reasonable a teacher's right of privacy in actually privately
talking with an underage student without any supervision, consent, or
family relationship. Thus, in limiting what society has to consider
reasonable, the proposed statute can meet the standards of privacy.

308.
309.

See supra Part III.
Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 967 (Mont. 1984).
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1 4 th Amendment

As argued in Part IV, the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act would
not hold up under the weight of strict scrutiny.310 While the proposed
statute is an improvement over the Amy Hestir Act, it would still be a
restriction on the right of free association found under the First
Amendment. As such, it would still be subject to strict scrutiny which
would require a compelling governmental interest achieved through
narrowly tailored means.
As with the Amy Hestir Act, the proposed statute seeks to protect
children from the sexual abuse of teachers. Therefore, the court would
see the statute as serving a compelling governmental interest similar to
the holding in Globe Newspaper.312 With the compelling interest
requirement taken care of, the next step would be to see if the proposed
statute was narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. The Amy Hestir Act
failed this requirement due to the incredible breadth of its reach in
denying teachers the ability to even use a social media site if it could
allow them to talk to their students privately. 313 The proposed statute, on
the other hand, only denies a teacher the right to actually communicate
with a student using one of these non-work related sites. This would not
ban a teacher from having a Facebook or Twitter account; it would only
prevent them from using such accounts to privately talk to students.
Moreover, this provision is further curtailed, as there are exceptions
under section 2 of the proposed statute which would allow teachers to
The proposed statute is a
privately communicate with students.
calculated retreat from the all or nothing approach put forward under the
Amy Hestir Act. By curtailing the number of teachers affected by the
statute, what actions are prohibited, and creating necessary exceptions,
the overbroad issue crippling the Amy Hestir Act fades away. Under
this set up, the court would likely find that the proposed statute is
narrowly tailored thus allowing it to stand up to even the toughest level
of scrutiny applied by the courts.

310. See supra Part IV.C.
See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
311.
312. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
313. See Joshua Rhett Miller, New Missouri Law Bans 'Exclusive' Online Contact Between
Teachers, Students, Fox NEWS (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/08/02/newmissouri-law-bans-exclusive-online-contact-between-teachers-students/.
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3. Other Situations in Which Teachers Communicate with Students
As discussed in Part V, there are other laws throughout the country
that deal with teacher communications.3 14 Through a review of those
cases and laws, it was shown that there were less restrictive ways to
write the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act without overly infringing
upon a teacher's right to communicate with others. The proposed statute
does not suffer from these sorts of deficiencies and thus would not be
susceptible to similar arguments.
Under the proposed statute, not all communications between
teachers and students are considered inappropriate. Under Section 2 of
the proposed statute there are multiple exceptions carved out enabling
teachers and students to communicate outside of the classroom. 315 This
restriction would pass the test of Chivers for the proposed statute is not
putting a stigma on all communications between teachers and students.
Unlike the Amy Hestir Act, the proposed statute only targets a limited
number of communications and there is nothing in the statute that
mandates punishment for teachers who even fall within this targeted
demographic. Thus, no stigma is automatically placed upon the
communications as was shown by the blanket ban in the Amy Hestir
Act.
In looking at the proposed statute in this light, it acts as a first step
in a process. A teacher's violation of the proposed statute would only
prompt an investigation into the alleged communication through a nonwork related website. What was actually communicated to the student
could then be evaluated in a similar fashion to the Ebersold case. If a
teacher violated the proposed statute, and after investigation it was
determined what they communicated to the child was inappropriate, the
teacher is subject to punishment under another state statute. This type of
set-up works well for teachers as they are allowed to keep their social
media websites, and works for the state as actually using these sites to
communicate with students without authorization opens the teacher up to
investigation and possible punishment under another statute.
Placed under the same light as the Amy Hestir Student Protection
Act, the proposed statute does not succumb to any of the pitfalls that
doomed the Missouri statute. Further, since the attacks on the proposed
statute came from an array of federal and multiple state concerns, it is
clear that the statute could likely survive challenges from any
314.
315.

See supra PartV.
See supra Section 2 of the Proposed Statute.
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jurisdiction that would adopt the proposed statute. With the strength of a
limited range of coverage and significant clarity, the proposed statute
should not only be adopted in Missouri, but all other states in order to
ensure uniformity in teacher/student communication.
VII. CONCLUSION
The schoolteacher's position is a complex one, especially
considering the recent advancements in technology and social
networking.316 On the one hand, a teacher strives to build close
relationships with students in order to form bonds of trust and
understanding, and to further the educational environment of the
classroom. 317 Social media websites have the potential to be used as
tools in this mission, by creating forums for class discussions and
encouraging learning outside of the classroom. 3 18 On the other hand,
teachers have lives that they keep separate from school, just as all
professionals have private personal lives that they isolate from their
colleagues at work. Limiting teachers in their personal lives by banning
their use of social media sites is an overextension of employer authority,
and a legislative imposition on personal freedoms. The intent behind the
legislative action was honorable, but in their zest to protect the Missouri
youth from harm and corruption, the legislature overstepped its bounds,
and created more problems than it solved. However, with the adoption
of the proposed statute put forth in this Note states will be able to walk
the fine line between keeping students safe from sexual abuse while
allowing teachers to express their protected freedoms over the World
Wide Web.
James R. Baez & Kerri E. Caulfield

316. See generally Ron Schachter, The Social Media Dilemma, DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION,
July/Aug. 2011, at 27 (discussing the problem school districts and teachers are facing in whether to
integrate social media sites into the classroom to facilitate the leaming environment for students).
317. See The Teacher Student Relationship, supra note 134.
318. See Miller, supra note 313.
* The authors of this note want to give special recognition to Professor Susan H. Joffe for all the
guidance given during the creation of this note. The authors would also like to thank James and
Diane Baez, Jim and Angel Caulfield, Ariel Sanders, and Tim Moore for all their love and support
throughout our endeavors.
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